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PATRICK VAN CAYSEELE* 
One of the least questioned areas of government
intervention is undoubtedly competition policy.1
Going back to the Sherman Act in 1890 in the US
and the European Economic Community Treaty
nearly 50 years ago, competition policies have a
long-standing tradition in economic life on both
sides of the Atlantic. But in Europe recent decades
have led to an even larger deployment of resources
in the area of antitrust enforcement as a result of the
devolution of some of the activity from the
European Community to the level of the member
states. In this period, the so-called “national compe-
tition authorities” (NCAs) were either started or
have increased their effectiveness, whereas the
above-mentioned devolution did not reduce the
scope of the European competition authority.
Overall, this has lead to an increase in resources
devoted to antitrust monitoring.
This brings up a different but related issue: even if
the welfare-enhancing effects of optimal competi-
tion policies are understood and accepted, the ques-
tion now is whether the resources allocated to these
policies are deployed in an effective and efficient
manner. Especially on the European scene, with its
fragmented multi-jurisdictional enforcement, it is
possible that several impediments to an optimal
organization of competition policies exist. If that is
the case,it is conceivable that real world competition
policies in Europe do not deliver the welfare
improvements that their blueprint design intended.
This contribution explores how effective and effi-
cient some of the national competition authorities
operate by reporting on recent research that has
focused on particular aspects of this general ques-
tion. Needless to say, given the absence of relevant
research findings some aspects that are possibly
problematic for the effectiveness and efficiency of
policy will not be elaborated in detail.Also the cov-
erage of countries in which effectiveness and effi-
ciency could be investigated has been limited.
Instead, we focus on small open economies, in par-
ticular Belgium and The Netherlands,for a variety of
reasons such as the closeness to actual policy-making
as a member of the authority, the research done on
these countries and recent availability of official
audit reports on both the Belgian and Dutch
antitrust authorities.
Multi-jurisdictional antitrust enforcement
The challenges to a multi-jurisdictional organization
of competition policy are many, and outnumber the
obvious advantages. In the area of merger review, it
is immediately clear that a cross-border operation
not handled by the EU has to be cleared by at least
two competition authorities.This leads to:
– duplication of administrative costs, both for the
companies involved and society as a whole;
– too strict enforcement of merger regulation and
errors of type II.2
Both points deserve further explanation.It is not hard
to see that preparing a file for two competition author-
ities requires more effort than for one.The additional
red tape costs for the company are probably some-
what less than double when preparing the file for the
second authority.3 But the administrative cost for gov-
ernment is not less, since it is simply not possible to
rely on decisions taken by a foreign authority, given
the difference in the objective function.4
In small open economies such as Belgium and the
Netherlands,this has led to the criticism that it is not
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1 An opposing view is given in Crandell and Winston (2003). This
viewpoint is contested in turn, by Connor (2004) and others.
2These include the disapproval of a merger that is welfare-enhanc-
ing, as opposed to errors of type I, which occur when a merger that
reduces welfare is not blocked by the authority. This point was
already raised by Evenett (2006).
3 One could say there are economies of scale in reducing addition-
al authorities,given that a substantial element of costs is data gath-
ering. See, however,Van Cayseele (1989) for an early contribution
on subadditivity of cost functions for dealing with government
agencies in the case of pharmaceutical companies registering pre-
scription drugs.
4 Smets and Van Cayseele (1991) even show how to a large extent
the objective functions are antagonistic when they constitute the
traditional sum of producer and consumer surplus, and the merged
entity repatriates profits, post-merger. Even when the NCAs look
at consumer surplus (a less accepted criterion), the situation in
both countries can be quite different, and each agency will need to
engage in a full review of the submitted merger file.entirely clear what the contribution of the agency is.
Furthermore, it is felt that this authority merely trig-
gers government spending to enforce a goal that is
perfectly executed by the market, given the open-
ness of the economy.The next section will investigate
this argument in detail, presenting empirical evi-
dence on the matter.
The second point raised involves a too strict attitude
vis-à-vis cross-border mergers. Since both jurisdic-
tions need to clear the operation, the review pro-
cess works like the Sah-Stiglitz hierarchy (see Van
Cayseele (2004), especially in the context of bank
merger approvals). The upshot is that when each of
the agencies has its own objective function, the
slightest incompatibility will imply a blocking of the
operation. This is easy to see in the case of bank
mergers when the merged entity acquires market
power but also takes more precautions against liq-
uidity shocks. When both the NCA and the Central
Bank need to approve of merger, it will never pass,
since the NCA (in the absence of pronounced effi-
ciency gains that allow a decrease in the loan inter-
est rates) will not applaud the consequences of
increased market power, although the Central Bank
is better off as a result of the increased precaution
taken against liquidity shocks. A similar effect is in
play when cross-border mergers are involved: it is
sufficient that the operation cannot be tolerated by
one single agency, because, for example, the loss of
consumer surplus in that country is substantial,
resulting in the operation being blocked even if it is
welfare-improving in many other countries.
Less documented, if not entirely absent in the dis-
cussion on multi-jurisdictional antitrust enforcement
is the fact that widely different regulations can cre-
ate distortions in the pattern of industry evolution.
The issue here is not the cost of cross-border merg-
ers but the costs and possibilities of within-border
mergers. It is well-known among industrial organisa-
tion and antitrust experts that the toughness of com-
petition policy may have a strong impact on the long-
run outcome of an industry. Taking a historical per-
spective, Bittlingmayer (1985) was the first to docu-
ment how antitrust policy in itself could have been
an explanation for a particular merger wave.Perhaps
the best illustration in this respect was documented
by John Sutton (1998) in what he has called “the fate
of Ilford”.
A few decades ago, the market for photographic
paper and film was dominated by a few players,
Agfa-Gevaert (Belgo-German), Kodak (US) and
Ilford (US). Today, lagger Fuji has taken over first
place, although all these companies are struggling to
survive in a world where the process of making pic-
tures has largely shifted from a chemical to an elec-
tronic one. But Ilford began to flounder much earlier,
as British authorities opposed the possibility of growth
via consolidation in the UK. The final result is a com-
pany which for more than three decades has no longer
been active on the international scene and which has
specialized in a particular niche. Agfa-Gevaert and
Kodak did not face this particular constraint and suc-
ceeded in positioning themselves on the global market.
Therefore, the different enforcement of antitrust
laws by different jurisdictions in the end implies a
different evolution of industry. Below, we illustrate
some differences in the various merger review
processes. It is still too early to test empirically
whether the documented differences have a role in
explaining variations from industry to industry. But
the differences are sometimes so remarkable that it
is hard to believe that they have no consequences.
Competition policy in a small open economy
Critics of competition policy, and in particular merg-
er review,have argued that the open character of the
Belgian and Dutch economies is sufficient to ensure
that a merger will not lead to the creation of market
power. To use economics terminology, markets in
small open economies are contestable. Imports (or
the threat of imports) are a perfect substitute for
competition policy.
Econometric analysis of price-cost margins indicates
that the picture is less clear-cut. Konings, Van
Cayseele and Warzynski (2001) estimate price-cost
margins and explain them by investigating the effect
of increased import penetration or competition pol-
icy enforcement. This is done using a panel data set
of over 20 industries in Belgium and the Nether-
lands.The results show very mixed findings.
For Belgium, downward pressure on price-cost mar-
gins doesn’t seem to come from competition policy
at all, but import penetration is an effective disci-
plining device. For the Netherlands the exact oppo-
site is true: imports hardly have an effect, whereas
with the enforcement of the 1999 competition law,
most industries have entered a period of decreased
margins. How can this be explained?
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There are several possible explanations. The first
merely says that the Belgian anti-trust authority was
not a very effective one.This might be a quite plau-
sible explanation: at one point in time the Belgian
authority even went on strike to point out the
tremendous lack of manpower to deal with all cases
properly. Other explanations are equally plausible,
however. The starting position between the two
countries could be different. In Belgium, competi-
tion policy replaced an elaborate system of price
controls. As economists, we immediately question
the effectiveness and efficiency of those controls and
we do so for good reasons. But they could have had
an effect, especially in a relative sense, as compared
to the Netherlands where such price controls had
been abolished much earlier.To some Dutch econo-
mists, the Netherlands in the previous low-competi-
tion era was called even “a cartel paradise”. So it
could have indeed been the case that due to anti-
competitive behaviour, the initial mark-ups were
higher in the Netherlands, and especially the fear of
getting caught and fined led Dutch industry into a
period of more moderate margins.
This however still does not explain the different
effect imports have. Here again we only can put for-
ward plausible arguments, without the pretension of
offering a final answer. One element that certainly
plays an important role is the composition of the
outputs that are aggregated in one and the same
industry.Belgium tends to be more specialised in the
manufacturing of bulk goods and semi-finished com-
ponents (Drèze 1960).The Netherlands manufacture
more finished goods, sold under their own brand
names. In more modern terminology, Belgium is
more into B2B and the Netherlands in B2C.
This implies that Belgian manufactured goods are
sold on markets where the model of price competi-
tion in homogeneous goods (the Bertrand model)
prevails. Dutch manufacturing then sells more in
niches, where important elements of non-price com-
petition also operate, or the market works along the
lines of models of product differentiation.
Increased imports of these goods to Belgian territo-
ry then indeed imply that buyers located further
inland in Europe have a choice: they can buy the
commodity manufactured in Belgium, or the same
good imported through Belgium.
This does not necessarily hold to the same degree for
the Netherlands,given the differentiated nature of the
goods. The Netherlands, in addition, are more active
in trading, where imports do not necessarily lead to
more competition with their own manufactured out-
put. On the contrary, the imported component could
provide a welcome complement that makes the bun-
dle, including both the domestically manufactured
and imported goods, a more attractive one.
Regardless of the explanation for the findings, the
facts remain.And these facts are that even for small
open economies neither import substitution nor
competition policy need to be effective in improving
allocative efficiency.It all depends on which factor is
(most) effective. In fact, they appear to be comple-
ments because our initial findings indicate that
where import penetration works better, antitrust
enforcement has less impact, and vice versa.
Are there really 50 different ways to implement
competition policy
The previous section illustrates that one cannot
immediately dismiss competition policy,not even for
small open economies. But shouldn’t these policies
be similar at least to some extent?
It is common knowledge that even conceptually
there are major differences regarding the approach
followed in setting up an antitrust policy (Borrell
2005).Some countries rely on ex ante merger review,
while others control ex post whether competition
has been restrained. Some rely on administrative
actions, others on the judiciary regime.Additionally,
there is a discussion in Europe on whether one
should rely exclusively on public enforcement or on
public and private enforcement.
Not long ago, some economists maintained that
within Europe the differences in antitrust policies
where not that great, given that all the national
regimes were copies of the articles in the EEC
Treaty.They were clearly misguided. In a qualitative
survey of the institutional features of antitrust poli-
cies in European member states (Belgium,Germany,
Italy and the Netherlands), Van Cayseele, Sabbatini
and Van Meerbeeck (2000) showed that even within
systems that heavily rely on an administrative,exclu-
sively public and ex ante system there are pro-
nounced differences.
And even if the regimes are basically the same, the
practical implementations might be very different.To show this,De Loecker,Konings and Van Cayseele
(2007) have focused on ex ante merger review in a
number of European countries. The differences are
striking, since to start with not all competition laws
use the same criteria to determine whether a merger
should be notified. In some countries, two criteria
are used, for instance individual and combined
domestic sales. Other countries introduce combined
worldwide sales. Still other countries add criteria,
such as market shares or total assets.
Furthermore, even when two countries use the same
set of criteria,like individual domestic and combined
worldwide sales, the thresholds vary substantially.
Compared to France, the Netherlands has twice the
level of domestic sales as a threshold. But it already
triggers review at 75 percent of the level of world-
wide sales.So the Netherlands favours larger players
on the home market and is stricter in its handling of
export champions, at least in comparison to France.
Perhaps the most astonishing fact for an industrial
economist is that in all countries the criteria are the
same for each and every industry.But industries vary
widely in respect of the prevailing scale economies,
volume of sales, etc. Hence, it becomes possible that
in certain sectors, each and every company individu-
ally exceeds the threshold for merger review, but at
the same time, there still are many players around
given the size of the market.The implication never-
theless will be that every conceivable merger will
need to be reviewed, no matter how unlikely it is to
create market power.Conversely,it is easily conceiv-
able that in another industry, where only 2 players
are left,a merger creating a monopoly does not need
to be reviewed by the authority because the individ-
ual companies do not exceed the sales thresholds.
The findings this leads to are surprising. Using an
algorithm that tests how many mergers need to be
reviewed, starting from all conceivable merger oper-
ations, wide differences appear across industries
within one and the same country and between coun-
tries within one and the same industry. The latter
finding is probably the most troublesome, recalling
the “fate of Ilford” described above. To give but a
few examples,in the manufacturing of chemicals and
chemical products (NACE 24), in France in 1999,
only 2.55 percent of all conceivable merger opera-
tions needed review by the competition authority. In
the same year and industry, 19.23 percent of all con-
ceivable operations in Belgium needed to be re-
viewed by the competition authority. And in the
Czech Republic, this was 24.95 percent. For the
manufacturing of pulp, paper and paper products
(NACE 21), in France only 0.79 percent of conceiv-
able merger candidates needed to pass review. In
Belgium it was 8.24 percent and in the Czech Re-
public 31.88 percent.
Of course, what matters in the end is how many
mergers get blocked by the authority. So although in
Belgium more operations needed to be reviewed
than in France, it could well be that as many opera-
tions as in France are admitted.In terms of the rejec-
tion percentage, France would then look much
“tougher”, since it grants permission for mergers for
the same number of cases as Belgium, but in
Belgium more operations need to be reviewed. But
at the same time,companies in Belgium will less like-
ly find a partner that allows for mergers without
review, and hence will be more often confronted
with the costs of filing. For a “large” operation, a
recent study indicates that these costs might run into
a figure of 100,000 euros for the companies involved.
In addition to those, there are the costs of adminis-
tration. Hence, widely differing thresholds, that do
not take into account the size of the country and the
presence of scale economics particular to each and
every industry, will impose large differences in the
transaction costs in the market for corporate control.
Conclusion
The previous sections show in part how multi-juris-
dictional competition policies may create distortions.
On all aspects, further research is necessary before
conclusive policy advice can be given. That is of
course always the case, and decision-makers often
have to act before everything is known. Viewing it
more positively, we are fortunate to know at least
some aspects of the usefulness of competition policy
in small open economies,on the nature of the distor-
tions that can result, etc.
Unfortunately,there are issues just as important that
are not only unresolved but where research has not
even started. The highest research priority must be
given to these issues.
One such example is to be found in the various
leniency programs that have been adopted by nearly
all of the NCAs. Two years after its inception, in
Belgium 16 cartels had already applied for leniency.
Undoubtedly some of these also operate on the
CESifo DICE Report 3/2007 26
Research ReportsCESifo DICE Report 3/2007 27
Research Reports
Dutch market,given the interwoven economic struc-
ture of Belgium and the Netherlands. What then
happens when companies apply for leniency in one
country but not in the other? Is the information they
provide to the authorities secret, or will one author-
ity pass it on to the other? At first sight, this might
seem an entirely academic question, as companies
who apply for leniency probably do so at the same
time in all countries in which they operated,presum-
ing information is exchanged between NCAs. But
then, since the leniency programmes are different in
terms of the reduction in fines, what is the overall
impact on leniency of having many and different
“tariff reductions”? For example,if in country A,the
fine reduction is 100 percent for the first firm, while
in country B this is only 40 percent, companies still
need to calculate in a fine of 60 percent of the fine in
country B.Clearly,if fining uses rules of thumb based
on sales, and country B is relatively large compared
to country A,this might still be a substantial amount.
And hence the company might decide not to apply
for leniency and leave the cartel unaffected. The
harsh treatment in country B,together with informa-
tion exchange between the NCAs, then renders
country A’s leniency policy completely ineffective.
Judging from the 100 percent fine reduction, one
could argue that country A relies a lot on its lenien-
cy policy to detect cartels, maybe because the NCA
lacks the skills necessary to find out about price fix-
ing practices, or because institutional factors favour
the formation and stability of cartels.
By a similar argument,country B only grants 40 per-
cent because it is well-equipped to fight cartels in the
absence of cooperating conspirators. But by doing
so, it interferes with its weaker colleague.
In summary,we started by noting that multi-jurisdic-
tional competition policies make a lot of sense, even
in the smaller open economies of the European
economy. But the widespread differences in how
these policies are implemented create pronounced
distortions that probably affect the level playing
field of competition in the EU.This apparently calls
for more coordination among the member states,
which is probably the case in the area of thresholds
for merger review.But in the end,it may even be that
coordinated behaviour, as with the exchange of
information in leniency programmes, is not the best
thing to do. This implies that for each and every
aspect of competition policy, a precise answer can
only be given after careful research has been con-
ducted. Given the increased level of resources allo-
cated to competition policies, such benchmarking
against both academic research and international
best practice really has become a priority.
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